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in the Naval Sea Systems Command. He is an op-
erations research analyst attached to Naval Surface 
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 To the inquiry, “What simple initial threat do I need to blockade a port with mines?,” various responses present themselves� Simple initial threat is basi-
cally the probability that the first vessel to attempt transiting the minefield will 
become a casualty, so that it no longer can perform its mission� The simple initial 
threat might be very low because the enemy is not very determined to overcome 
the minefield; it might be very high because the enemy is very determined to 
do so� An enemy with a strong mine countermeasure presence or one willing to 
accept a high degree of risk simply might channelize through the minefield and 
accept whatever attrition occurs, making simple initial threat a useless measure 
of effectiveness (MOE) for blockading� The question asked above seeks to deter-
mine what conditions determine the simple initial threat from mines that would 
be needed to accomplish designated objectives, or 
whether another MOE would be more suitable for 
the purpose�
Historically, maritime mine warfare has been 
called on to achieve various effects to support na-
val strategies�1 Land mines have provided a means 
to achieve some similar objectives; while there are 
certainly variations between maritime and land 
mines, the core principles are remarkably similar� 
The methodology for determining how many mar-
itime mines are required to achieve a desired effect 
has never been evaluated fully, because of the com-
plexity of the subject—including important factors 
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rooted in human psychology� MOEs currently in use are informative but do not 
answer the question of the level of risk that mines need to create to achieve a par-
ticular goal, such as closing a port� This article adapts methodologies developed 
for land mines/obstacles to maritime mining, owing to their inherent similarity; 
aligns MOEs to operational objectives; explores developmental mining concepts; 
and presents new MOEs for maritime mines�
Maritime mines generally will not win a war by themselves; however, they 
have the potential to change the outcome of a war by complementing other 
platforms and weapon systems� Incorporating mines to complement submarine, 
surface, air, land, and special forces can increase force effectiveness exponentially� 
In that regard, commanders should understand clearly how maritime mining ef-
fects can be used to increase the capability of the fleet and to dictate operational 
maneuvers and efficiency of movement� History has demonstrated that mines 
are a strategic weapon that can inflict physical and psychological damage that 
impacts the military, economic, and political wellness of an enemy sufficiently to 
change the course of a war�
Physical damage, such as the sinking of a ship or damaging of it to the point 
where it aborts its mission, is often the grading scale associated with the MOE of 
a minefield� However, other grading scales do not depend on physical damage� If 
the intent is to create a barrier and the declared minefield affects enemy move-
ment, the field has merit� The mine is not the primary weapon; it is a subset of the 
primary weapon—the minefield itself� History provides examples of minefields 
being very successful despite augmentation by decoy mines, or even being made 
up entirely of decoy mines, or simply being declared fields without any weapons 
in them at all� The last case, especially, shows us that a minefield’s greatest threat 
is not to enemy shipping but to the enemy psyche� Greer and Bartholomew point 
out that “the real effect of a minefield derives from a subtler influence—an exag-
gerated fear�”2 However, a “brittle” minefield can be pierced easily by countermea-
sures and then might collapse, negating the intended effect� It is important that 
the enemy experience a robust minefield capability that is replicable if we are to 
capitalize on that exaggerated fear—a fear that may be strong enough to allow 
a minefield without mines to be durable over time� This article starts from the 
original question, reviews the concepts currently in doctrine, and offers ideas on 
how to extend beyond them�
A BRIEF HISTORY
The lessons the Russians learned during the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War 
about the impact of both defensive and offensive mining were not lost on the 
participants in the two world wars�3 Russian mines were more effective against 
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Japanese battleships than the Russian fleet was� However, as noted, the fear of a 
minefield can have effects beyond the sinking of ships�
During the First World War, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, France, and 
Great Britain lost 240 submarines, with mines or mine-nets causing sixty-eight 
of those losses� Germany lost thirty-eight U-boats to these causes, with the Dover 
Barrage (a minefield aimed at denying German submarines access to the English 
Channel) claiming sixteen of them in the last year of the war� While the loss of 
sixteen submarines is significant, the real power was in the strategic value: the 
barrage forced the U-boats to take a much longer route to begin their operations, 
which had critical effects on the submarine population and the boats’ time in an 
operating area� While the Germans focused on the tactical aspects of mine war-
fare, sinking more than one million tons of Allied merchant shipping, the Allies 
understood the strategic value of mine warfare�4 At Gallipoli the Allied powers, 
despite having a clear advantage in overall military capability, learned how dev-
astating a minefield supported by gunfire can be� The combined threat caused 
the Allies to pause when they should have pressed forward, and this inaction by 
Allied commanders caused their mission to fail�5
Mines also played a major role in the Second World War, for both Allied and 
Axis powers, with mines used to achieve strategic effects�6 For example, while 
some criticize the Northern Mine Barrage (defensive minefields designed to 
restrict German access to the Atlantic Ocean) for a lack of kills (although some 
kills may have gone unnoticed and uncredited), the mine barrage is what caused 
Bismarck to be detected, which eventually led to its sinking in May 1941�7 In the 
Pacific, mining in Palau trapped thirty-two Japanese ships in port, providing a 
target-rich environment; Allied aircraft sank twenty-three ships and damaged the 
remainder with bombs and torpedoes in March 1944� Mining also contributed 
to the sinking of ships by forcing vessels away from mined coastlines, which al-
lowed radar to direct aircraft for attacks in the open ocean� The Japanese navy 
responded to maritime mining by abandoning anchorages at Palau, Penang, and 
Kavieng in the western Pacific area� Ground forces also benefited from naval 
mining because disruptions in supply caused problems for the Japanese army in 
China, Burma, Siam, Malaya, and Indochina�8
Contrary to popular belief, both world wars brought the fight to the shores 
of the United States, and maritime mines played a huge role in submarine shore 
defense, which kept supply ports open and ensured that major military and 
industrial complexes remained operational in support of the war effort� The 
National Park Service notes that in the defense of San Francisco Bay, “[i]f the big 
guns failed to stop an enemy vessel far offshore, the next line of defense was three 
minefields�”9 Later, in Vietnam, the mining of Haiphong Harbor in 1972 did what 
bombers alone had seemed unable to do: impose coercive diplomacy� Maritime 
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mines closed the port, which forced supply lines to go overland, making the 
bombing campaign incredibly effective against trucks and trains� Because of the 
lack of supply routes, the North Vietnamese offense stalled; in fact, the North 
Vietnamese were unable to initiate any major offensive campaigns� This effect 
is credited widely to the maritime mines that prevented the resupply of their 
forces� Thus, maritime mines were the major factor in bringing North Vietnam 
to the negotiating table and in the release of American prisoners of war� One has 
to wonder what the outcome of the war would have been had suggestions from 
Admiral Thomas H� Moorer, USN (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff),  for the 
mining of major ports not been ignored earlier in the war�10
As referred to above, the value of a mine often is in its second-order effects� 
Mines have limited U-boats’ time on station, facilitated the sinking of enemy 
ships by aircraft, caused ports to be abandoned, made land campaigns difficult 
by choking replenishment, and kept harbors safe, and have been the weapon of 
choice for coercive diplomacy� A minefield is completely capable of achieving 
its objective through the attrition of enemy vessels that transit the minefield, or 
through fear of the minefield, which may cause enemy forces to avoid potential 
losses, including by leaving their ships in port� Furthermore, the mere capability 
to mine effectively may be enough to cause enemy forces to choose not to chal-
lenge a declared minefield that may have no actual mines�
Commanders must decide what type of minefields to use to obtain their 
operational objective� Captain Wayne P� Hughes, USN (Ret�), of the Naval Post-
graduate School points out that mines can act both to attack enemy commerce 
and to defend our own commerce, particularly in antisubmarine warfare, in a 
number of ways� 
1� “Ensure safety of goods and services: navies protect the movement of 
shipping and means of war on the oceans and safeguard stationary forces, 
to include nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) and 
coastal patrols�”
2� “Deny safety of enemy goods and services: navies prevent the movement 
of enemy shipping and means of war and threaten enemy forces, such as 
SSBNs�”11
DEFINING THE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES
In many regards, the principles of maritime mining are similar to those govern-
ing the use of obstacles, barriers, and mines in land warfare� Objectives such as 
disrupt, fix, turn, and block are pursued both on land and at sea� However, cur-
rent Navy doctrine chooses to provide specific effects rather than leverage sets of 
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effects for communication� For example, Navy mine policy specifies that mines 
be usable to “deny the enemy the ability to carry out amphibious operations, or 
in support of friendly amphibious operations, or to destroy enemy ships and 
submarines directly�”12
The different policy descriptions can be harmonized, however; by incorporat-
ing specific effects within sets of effect terms (such as block, fix, turn, or disrupt), 
the planner gains a clearer understanding of how to achieve the specific policy� 
Yet while recognizing the numerous technical distinctions between naval and 
land warfare, the Navy might benefit from treating specific effects as subsets 
within sets of effects� This matter of deciding how to join sets and subsets may 
seem like a chicken-and-egg discussion; the key point is to have a method that 
describes the objectives sufficiently for commanders and their staffs to go beyond 
consideration of specific examples of maritime mining to incorporate maritime 
mining within operational art� For example, a minefield established with the 
intent to harass, deter, or send a political message would fall under the disrupt 
objective, while the intent to cause a delay long enough to allow delivery of a 
strike package could fall under the fix objective�
To derive the definitions used here for operational objectives, I extended those 
found in Marine Corps doctrine to focus more on maritime mining�13 Concep-
tual examples follow the definitions, with historical references provided to clarify 
interpretations of those definitions� Concepts also are derived from Barriers, 
Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-15�14 The 
examples discussed below do not cover the full range of intent, but rather provide 
a framework for how to categorize intent�
Disrupt
Definition. When a minefield is used to alter enemy formations and tempo, inter-
rupt enemy timetables, cause the enemy to begin mine countermeasures (MCM) 
operations, or some combination thereof�
Conceptual Examples. (1) A defensive field that causes enemy formations to 
channelize through the field, to where hunters wait for them on the other side� 
(2) An offensive field designed to delay the resupplying of enemy ports�
Historical Example. During World War II, the maritime mining of Siamese (Thai) 
waters by the United States disrupted Japanese supply chains anywhere from a day 
to a month, which degraded the supply line for the Japanese army�15
Fix
Definition. When a minefield is designed to slow or stop targets to create a 
target-rich environment for friendly forces in an engagement area� Ideally, this 
field would inhibit the enemy’s capability to defend itself against friendly forces�
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Conceptual Example. Mining a port to delay the departure of targets of interest, 
with the intention of sending in an air strike�
Historical Example. During World War II, thirty-two Japanese ships were trapped 
in port at Palau, providing a target-rich environment for Allied aircraft attacking 
with bombs and torpedoes�16
Turn
Definition. When a minefield is intended to divert enemy formations from their 
intended transit onto one that is advantageous to friendly units�
Conceptual Examples. (1) Turning enemy forces toward an engagement� (2) 
Turning enemy forces so as to increase the length of their transit routes, thereby 
preventing them from having adequate time in an operational area�
Historical Example. During World War I, the Dover Barrage forced U-boats to 
travel around a minefield, which reduced their time in their operational areas, 
and therefore their ability to interfere with Allied vessels�17
Block
Definition. When a minefield is emplaced to stop maritime traffic along a spe-
cific avenue of approach� Blocking minefields should be able to withstand enemy 
MCM techniques, including clearance through attrition, using creativity, tech-
nology, mine density, or some combination thereof to overcome enemy efforts� 
While all minefields can be integrated with joint/integrated fires, blocking mine-
fields benefit the most�
Conceptual Examples. (1) An offensive minefield whose purpose is to close an 
enemy port for some duration of time� (2) A defensive field that is used to prevent 
an amphibious landing by the enemy�
Historical Example. The mining of Haiphong Harbor during the Vietnam War 
stopped all shipping even before the minefield was actually live� Sea traffic did 
not resume until after the U�S� Navy cleared the minefield�18
The maritime mining terminology currently in use provides the general location 
of a minefield� Offensive minefields are located within twelve nautical miles of the 
enemy’s coastline� Protective minefields are located within twelve nautical miles 
of a friendly coastline� Defensive minefields are located more than twelve nautical 
miles from land�
PREPARING TO MEET REQUIREMENTS  
FOR OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES
What impact on the target must be accomplished to meet the commander’s in-
tent? Three levels of damage frame intent: mobility kill, mission abort, and destroy� 
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Mobility kill constitutes damaging the target so that it loses the ability to control 
speed and heading� Mission abort is defined as damaging the target such that it 
is not capable of exercising some set of predefined capabilities� Destroy means to 
damage a target so that it sinks�
Begin by assuming that the number of mines in a field may vary on the basis 
of the level of damage required� (This is not the rule itself, but a framework for 
conveying the concept�) Hold weapon, target, and conditions constant� In this 
conceptual scenario, a planner would need x number of mines for mission abort, 
but may need x − k mines to achieve mobility kill and x + k mines to destroy� 
Why does this matter? If the commander intends to block a port with an offen-
sive minefield that is not in any of the engagement areas, planners could elect 
to design fields to cause mobility kills that will prevent adversary vessels from 
reaching their patrol or engagement areas� Saving the k mines thus not needed 
(given that k might represent only one mine—or a hundred) may reduce the 
risk to delivery platforms, or reduce the number of weapons required to meet 
the MOE, or both� In another situation, a defensive field might be designed to 
disrupt within an engagement area, with the planner choosing to aim at de-
stroy or mission abort to achieve the commander’s intent� Simply put, planners 
should have the capability to match a desired level of damage to the operational 
objective�
Minefield planning relies on understanding weapon-to-target matching, yet it 
maintains some characteristics of an art, in that it must account for the psycho-
logical perspectives of those subjected to the mining; both aspects will dictate the 
planner’s course of action� Commanders and planners must remember that the 
psychological aspect of mine warfare is often its greatest strength; therefore they 
should exploit the fears of the enemy creatively� However, planners should start 
from some core ideas, on which they can expand as needed� I offer the definitions 
of key terms below as such a starting point� (They assume the capability to plan 
and deliver precision-placed mines�) 
• Mine group: A set of mines placed to provide a layer of threat to a target� The 
mine group need not be linear� The advent of precision-placed mines will 
provide planners the ability to plan randomly, semirandomly, linearly, or 
with optimized precision� Planners can create all types of patterns, although 
for ease of illustration this article uses mine groups with linear patterns�
• Mine segment: A collection of mines that are associated with each other 
according to conditions that impact performance� Mine segments can exist 
within a mine group or can consist of one or more mine groups� Figure 1 
provides an example of multiple mine groups making up a mine segment, 
while figure 2 provides an example of a mine group that is segmented�
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• Minefield: A composition of one or more mine segments that are implement-
ed to achieve a specific operational objective. Minefields and segments are 
planned to meet an appropriate measure of effectiveness. Multiple minefields 








Multiple mine groups within a mine segment
FIGURE 1
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• Layered minefield: The design of a single or multiple minefields where the 
target is expected to pass through more than one mine segment or minefield. 
The purpose is to understand the cumulative threat to the target.
• Minefield set. A group of minefields used to achieve an operational objective 
in a specific area.
• Mine danger zone: An area that is declared—in accordance with the Hague 
Convention of 1907—to alert vessels that the designated area might contain 
maritime mines and that safe passage within the area may not be possible.19
Figure 3 is a graphical depiction of the concept of layered minefields. Ideally, 
the minefield would be planned to meet the desired level of damage and threat 
to a target. The minefields then would be layered to meet the desired operational 
objective.
PLANNING TO ACHIEVE AN OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE
Mine groups should be layered within the mine segment to build an appropriate 
level of threat within an area of the minefield. The two concepts that apply are 
the density of the mine group and the number of mine groups needed within a 
minefield to achieve the disrupt, fix, turn, and block functions. The psychologi-
cal condition of the enemy and its willingness to accept risk will determine the 
number of minefields and the density required to meet the commander’s intent. 







Layered mineelds within a mine danger zone
 
FIGURE 3
LAYERED MINEFIELDS WITHIN A MINE DANGER ZONE
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however, trends, status reports, and military judgment can provide enough infor-
mation to deploy an initial minefield, one that later can be reshaped or reseeded 
to strengthen it� A single sparse minefield might be sufficient to achieve the 
disrupt and fix effects, whereas robust minefields may be needed for successful 
turn or block functions� The number of possible targets in the area will impact the 
number of rows of mine groups or minefields needed to achieve the desired ef-
fect� Figure 4 shows a notional guidance to communicate concepts of application�
Although there are exceptions, disrupt-type fields typically will be constructed 
from mine groups consisting of fewer mines than would other types� Such mine-
fields will have fewer mine rows� A notional example is a minefield made up of 
two rows of mine groups, with each mine group presenting a threat level of x� 
Even though a disrupt field should require fewer mines, since it is not designed 
to blockade a port, an enemy may choose not to challenge the field, effectively 
making the disrupt field a block field�
Fix fields should have mine groups that provide a somewhat higher threat level 
than disrupt fields, to extend the delay time for strike missions by increasing the 
risk of mine-to-target interactions or to complicate enemy MCM efforts further� 
Yet fix fields will have the same, or a similar, number of rows of mine groups 
within a minefield� A notional example is a minefield made up of two rows of 
mine groups, with each mine group providing a threat level of y, where y > x, with 
x being the threat of a disrupt field�
Turn fields should have mine groups providing a significant threat and a large 
number of rows of mine groups� This increase in threat, along with the depth 
of the field, should represent enough risk to the enemy that it would rather run 
the risk of what awaits its ships through the turn than risk a continual transit 
through a field it cannot counter, owing to limitations in time or technology� A 
notional example is a minefield consisting of six rows of mine groups, with each 
mine group having a threat of z, where z > y, with y being the threat of a fix field�
Block fields should have mine groups providing a significant threat and a large 
number of rows, as well as some additional mines seeded to account for enemy 
persistence� The goal is to make transit through the minefield so perilous that an 
enemy refuses to challenge the field� However, complete and long-term blocks 
may be nearly impossible to achieve, depending on what attrition rates the en-
emy will accept� A notional example is a minefield consisting of six rows of mine 
groups, with each mine group having a threat of z + k, where z is the threat of a 
turn field and k represents the additional mines added to the minefield�
Figure 4 is merely illustrative; the mine groups might be consistent or incon-
sistent in their placement on the basis of length� A minefield planner will exer-
cise knowledge and creativity to determine where the individual mines should 
be placed� The figure provides an example useful for introducing concepts for 
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discussion. However, its primary purpose is to clarify terms, not to limit mining 
to ports; the same paradigm can be applied across maritime mining concepts.
PAIRING OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES WITH  
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
It is critical to pair operational objectives with appropriate MOEs. While simple 
initial threat is a good MOE to use for disrupt, and possibly fix, fields, it is a poor 
measure for establishing how many mines are required to block a determined 
adversary, because it does not take into account mine attrition resulting from 
strikes and MCM activity. Instead, penetrator distribution and expected casual-
ties (described below) would be suitable MOEs for the block function. Com-
manders must be able to articulate their intentions via pairing an operational 
objective with an MOE, such that clear communication occurs throughout the 
chain of command.
New MOEs also are needed—MOEs that fit with operational objectives. Oth-
















ONCEPTUAL MINE REQUIREMENTS PER OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE
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merely the best fit from within the current list of MOEs� Condensed definitions 
of MOEs and suggestions for pairing current MOEs with operational objectives 
are given below; however, current MOEs were not designed specifically to meet 
the operational objectives discussed�
It is also necessary to note that casualties are not always the best criterion for 
analyzing minefield success� For example, assume that in areas A and B a plan-
ner needs to achieve a turn, and uses cumulative casualty distribution to plan the 
minefields� In area A, the enemy chooses not to challenge the minefield and turns 
accordingly—thus, the minefield does not cause a single casualty—whereas in 
area B, the enemy chooses to challenge the minefield and loses three ships, but 
does not turn and is able to move forward� Considering the loss of enemy ships, 
one might conclude that area B was more effective; however, area A actually was 
more successful at supporting the strategic objectives for the conflict� This line 
of analysis demonstrates that new MOEs must be developed not only to match 
the intent of the commander’s operational objective correctly but also to broach 
a discussion about new MOEs for future mining capabilities� Table 1 provides 
MOE Descriptor
Time Two measures of time: 
(1)  the effective life of the minefield
(2)  the time required to execute the specified mining mission
Risk The threat level of the minefield to enemy transitors and the risk 
to friendly transitors (active mines that lack remote command and 
control are a risk to both enemy and friendly forces)
Initial threat The probability that the first vessel to attempt transiting through the 
minefield will become a casualty
Casualty density distribution The probability that exactly k casualties will occur in n transit at-
tempts through the minefield
Threat profile The minefield threat to each successive transitor in a sequence of n 
transit attempts through the minefield
Expected casualties The average number of casualties, k, in a given number of transits, 
n, through a minefield that would occur in a large number of repeti-
tions of n transit attempts under statistically equivalent conditions
Cumulative casualty distribution The probability of at least k casualties out of n transits through the 
minefield
Sustained threat The measure of a minefield’s ability to resist the effects of enemy 
mine countermeasures and provide a continued threat following pas-
sage of the first enemy transitors
Penetrator distribution The probability of exactly j penetrators (targets that safely transit the 
minefield) in n transit attempts through the minefield
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTORS OF CURRENT MOEs
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descriptors of current MOEs; table 2 provides recommendations for matching 
them to objectives� 
The methodology used pairs the operational objective with the current MOE 
that best suits the intent of the operational objective� For example, if the intent is 
to disrupt an enemy, the best MOEs to use may be time and initial threat, because 
of the relative amount of investment required to achieve the desired effects� If 
the intent is to cause an enemy to delay the departure of his assets and force him 
to conduct MCM, merely causing him to perceive some threat may delay the 
departure of ships and bring on MCM operations� This may be achieved via an 
initial threat versus a penetrator distribution, which might obviate the need for a 
massive investment, depending on the choices made for the j penetrators out of 
n transitors�
WHY IT MATTERS
The mine warfare community is small; it lacks the exposure and training afforded 
to many other warfare areas� This has decayed the understanding and valuation 
of the U�S� Navy’s mining capability, which then compounds the exposure and 
training deficits� This result further complicates matters through a loss of ap-
preciation for the painstaking process that minefield planners must complete to 
continue to provide sound plans�
Having clear operational objectives and their associated MOEs linked together 
will provide decision makers with the information necessary to match each MOE 
to its desired effect� The question of what simple initial threat is needed to block-
ade a port is a difficult one even in a specific context, especially when even the 
threat of a minefield may blockade a port� However, until we fully understand 
the psychology of our adversary—a daunting proposition—it is clear that we 
must look at more-appropriate MOEs to achieve a blockade� Effective mining is 
Operational Objective Applicable MOEs(time and sustained threat are implied considerations throughout)
Disrupt Initial threat
Fix Initial threat
Low levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution, penetrator 
distribution
Turn High levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution, penetrator 
distribution
Block Highest levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution,  
penetrator distribution
TABLE 2
RECOMMENDED PAIRINGS USING CURRENT MOEs
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achieved through clear operational objectives, MOEs, training, planning tools, 
and effective delivery� Tools and training should be developed to optimize what 
can be delivered, considering the dynamics of conflict�
THE MINES OF TOMORROW
During a November 2015 Mine Warfare Association event, Expeditionary War-
fare (OPNAV N95) discussed several efforts to advance the capabilities of mari-
time mining� The current mine inventory is seeing new algorithms and increased 
capabilities� Some of the mines of tomorrow will be delivered from unmanned 
underwater vehicles equipped with large-diameter tubes� Technological initia-
tives are striving to create precision mining with standoff for air-delivery plat-
forms; other efforts include remote-control capability and wide-area coverage�20 
Open-source literature gives us a glimpse of possibilities, starting with the next 
iteration of air-delivered mines�
Precision air-delivered mines for use at standoff ranges are being created 
from mine components that are already in the U�S� inventory� Efforts to provide 
mines with the same splash-point accuracy of a Joint Direct Attack Munition 
are under way through Quickstrike-J� To expand further the capability of preci-
sion air-delivered mines, efforts to extend ranges also are moving forward with 
Quickstrike-ER� Success will allow a B-52H to lay an entire minefield in one 
pass, without having to fly over the minefield, while achieving mine-placement 
accuracies within six meters of aim points on the seabed�21
Smart mining will provide commanders with wide-area-coverage minefields, 
positive control of the minefield, and the ability to engage multiple targets that use 
the same transit path� Unlike traditional minefields, a single weapon-to-target in-
teraction does not cause a hole in the minefield (assuming that there is more than 
a single weapon); thus, a persistent threat to traffic will remain despite adversary 
efforts to channelize traffic to minimize traditional mine engagements�
McGeehan and Wahl call for the use of underwater gliders to carry guidance 
and trigger systems and explosives—effectively, to convert them into smart 
mines� Their concept calls for using “flash mob” tactics: mobile mines converg-
ing on shipping lanes and choke points, or simply creating a barrier� These mines 
would be able to avoid mine countermeasures while waiting for instructions� Fur-
thermore, such a concept would allow friendly units to pass through safely, with 
the barrier reestablished behind them� New effects also are being introduced to 
detain ships by fouling props and rudders, or disabling them by other nonkinetic 
means� Using nonlethal mines would allow the neutralization rather than the 
sinking of targets—to enforce an embargo, for instance�22
The United States is not the only country interested in using mining to re-
duce the capabilities of potential adversaries� According to GlobalSecurity�org, 
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Iran can produce nonmagnetic, free-floating, and remote-controlled mines�23 
Furthermore, it also may have acquired mines from Russia and negotiated for 
rocket-propelled rising mines from China� In another example, Goldstein pro-
vides evidence that China views maritime mining as an important component 
of naval warfare�24 Its concepts for mine delivery include air, surface, and sub-
surface platforms that can deliver mines so as to provide challenges in both ports 
and open water� Mining is such a key component for China that fishing vessels 
may be called on to “block foreign enemy intervention�” To counter our surveil-
lance, MCM, and antisubmarine warfare capabilities, China also is looking at 
emerging technology to target aircraft, using mines that launch missiles� Truver 
further describes China’s mining capability, mentioning that the country has 
more than thirty types of mines, including remote-controlled, rocket-propelled, 
and mobile varieties�25 Several other countries’ capabilities in maritime mining 
are progressing, and it would be a mistake to think they are looking only at tra-
ditional measures�
MINEFIELD PLANNING CAPABILITIES
Pietrucha points out that advances in mining technology are outpacing the capac-
ity of planners to design minefields properly� As new maritime mining capabili-
ties are added, the tools and concepts of mine warfare should evolve to maximize 
the effectiveness of the new maritime mines�26 This is particularly important with 
regard to the emerging capabilities of the Clandestine Delivered Mine System (in 
which unmanned vehicles deliver mines) and the new Quickstrike-J/ER mine 
(which will be in service shortly), followed by other advanced mining concepts�
Initial threat is determined with regard to the minefield as it exists before an 
enemy attempts to challenge the minefield� After the initial target-to-weapon 
engagement (particularly in cases involving explode-in-place mines) the threat 
level is changed, because the minefield itself is no longer the same� A new analy-
sis would be needed to determine the threat that the remaining mines represent� 
In some cases, planners and operational leaders themselves—especially those 
unfamiliar with mining—may not understand the reduction in the threat that 
the revised field poses, and may assume that the initial threat is sustained for 
each target� Such an interpretation might lead to operational or tactical miscal-
culation, perhaps with catastrophic results� On the other hand, mining concepts 
based on weaponized distributive sensor nodes may mean that the threat will be 
consistent for each target until weapon depletion, assuming the field is planned 
to engage each target�
Minefield planning capabilities and language must be created to enable plan-
ning for and communicating about future minefields, especially those involv-
ing precision placement� For instance, planners should be able to convey plans 
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readily for various traffic patterns� This is particularly important for fields in 
choke points (for cumulative casualty–type measures) and open-water fields (in 
which targets might advance in a spread formation, enabling the minefield to in-
teract with multiple targets at once)� It is possible simply to add terms to current 
and future minefield plans to differentiate the assumptions� Examples include 
channelized cumulative casualty distribution and random cumulative casualty dis-
tribution, where channelized and random are meant to clarify assumptions about 
the targets’ behavior through the minefield (channelized: targets enter the field in 
a line; random: targets enter the field at random locations)� Effective language is 
needed to communicate the specifics of fields that soon may be constructed us-
ing a greatly expanded list of effectors, and this language should be incorporated 
into the planning tool�
MINING MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS EXPANSION
While operational objectives are critical to any strategy, it is important for mine 
planners and commanders to have something against which to measure their 
fields� While the MOEs now in place measure current capabilities adequately, 
emerging mining capabilities will require new MOEs to assess their effects� In the 
discussion below I identify concepts for MOE expansion to meet the upgraded 
capabilities of today’s mines, as well as those of tomorrow�
The first is continuous threat�27 The premise is to plan fields for a threat level 
for n number of targets, given k number of effectors� (For now, explosive effec-
tors that engage one target will be the focus, but the Navy also is assessing various 
other effectors, both kinetic and nonkinetic�) Essentially, continuous threat means 
being able to maintain simple initial threat for a determined number of follow-on 
targets� For example, the simple initial threat may be x for the first targets, then 
be lowered to y for the next, while continuous threat maintains the threat of x 
for various targets� Planners would be able to incorporate effectively targeting 
optimization, counters, probability of fire, delay arm, and other capabilities early 
on in the planning process to determine the resources required to create the or-
dered field� Furthermore, with the ability in the near future to practice precision 
placement of mines and to combine that with some degree of positive control of 
the minefield, the command and control authority should be able to check the 
“health” of the field and maintain it by reseeding mines or reshaping the field� 
This should permit the authority to limit the number of sorties required to ensure 
that the field maintains its designed threat level right up until the field can no 
longer achieve the intended threat level or is depleted of effectors� While a num-
ber of factors dictate the threat the field represents, the premise is to maintain 
the threat against multiple targets, regardless of what formation or channeliza-
tion they choose� This MOE is particularly relevant to weaponized distributive 
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sensor–type mining systems. Continuous threat is one of the small number of 
MOEs that should fit under any of the operational objectives.
A natural extension from the continuous threat MOE is the threat over time 
MOE. The concept is that commanders would be able to implement threat to n 
targets per day (or some other time measure—e.g., hours) for a desired duration. 
The idea is to optimize systems so as to vary threat level t for n out of k targets 
per day over some duration of time. This MOE may be used to highlight spe-
cific times of interest, such as high tide; reduce threat during low tide; or simply 
exercise a variable threat throughout the time. Planners can employ this MOE 
with creativity to achieve their objectives. The threat over time MOE lends itself 
to forecasting reseeding requirements, which would assist with asset and supply 
planning, as well as providing considerations for repositioning planning (shoot 
and relocate, shoot and withdraw) for self-relocating effectors and effector/ 
vehicle minefields or applications of remote command and control with explode-
in-place mines. This MOE would fall under the disrupt and fix operational 
objectives.
Extensions of the current time MOE might capture estimated time of opera-
tional effect. Extension becomes necessary when, for instance, a minefield is still 
active even though it no longer can achieve its original intended objective. The 
MOE would be based on mixed-method analysis from known capabilities and 
military judgment, refined as information and intent change throughout the 
conflict. This MOE inherently suffers from numerous sources for error; how-
ever, it also has the potential to provide an answer concerning time. For example, 
consider the commander’s operational objective of blockade, intended to close 
a port. While the ability to execute a mining mission is critical, the importance 
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This graphic communicates the idea that a threat level can remain 
the same for targets, until the system is no longer capable of 
maintaining threat, e.g. all weapons are expended
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This graphic communicates the idea that a threat level can remain the same for targets until the system is 
no longer capable of maintaining threat—e.g., all weapons are expended.
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of the amount of time the field will be operationally relevant should not be lost; 
thus, the commander will want to know the best estimate for the length of time 
the field will be able operationally to support the strategic objectives of the 
fleet. Providing this answer requires combining multiple variables into a “best 
estimate.” Answering the commander’s important question—“How long?”—will 
require a range of subject-matter experts to assist the planner in assigning values 
to these variables. The first variable is the initial threat of the field needed (with 
counter-countermeasures already defined) to cause the enemy to perceive threat 
in the port. The second variable is the enemy’s acceptable attrition rate—that is, 
what level of casualties he is willing to accept to challenge the field (including 
with hardened vessels or those that choose to disregard the risk) before con-
ducting professional MCM. Essentially, this variable captures what attrition the 
enemy considers acceptable in attempting to open a channel via brute-force port 
breakout.
The next variable considers enemy MCM. To calculate its value, intelligence 
officers will determine how important the port is relative to other ports, the en-
emy’s order of battle for clearing fields, where those credible enemy MCM assets 
are located, and how long it will take for them to transit to the port of interest. 
Assigning a value to this variable will require assistance from MCM experts and 
intelligence officers. MCM experts will use software tools (such as the Naval 
Mine Warfare Simulation) to determine how long it will take to clear a channel 
through the field. Intelligence officers will estimate the enemy’s level of accept-
able risk, as well as an MCM skill multiplier that compares the enemy’s abilities 
with our own, based on trends and other sources of information. Once these 
values are determined, the planner can create a minefield calculated to provide 
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The figure abstractly communicates the potential to vary threat to different targets across some length of time. For instance, Time 1 may be 
a single day, with consistent threat for the first six targets (n), t n varying threat levels ( ) over the k targets with respect to time. Multiple 
threat times are depicted to address the flexibility of the time scale: weeks, days, hours, etc. Time 2 demonstrates threat during a specific time, 
such as high tide. Time 3 shows the potential for variation across targets over time.
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an estimated time of operational effect. Like continuous threat, this MOE will fit 
under any of the operational objectives.
The final MOE offered is scalable traffic. While this MOE can have direct 
military application, it mainly is intended to support political and economic 
impacts. Ideally, this MOE would be associated with a mine that is highly reliable 
and has an efficient discrimination capability. Examples of military applications 
include forcing the enemy to change his replenishment behavior and reducing 
traffic in an area to increase the probability that a given vessel in the minefield is a 
desired target. Achieving a political/economic impact would require knowing, or 
estimating with some appropriate level of confidence, what level of threat would 
be needed to deter noncombatants from entering an area of interest. This MOE 
would require initial research efforts to provide an estimate of likely courses of 
action from military, commercial, and private vessels that commonly operate 
within an area of interest. This MOE would allow commanders to employ the 
minimum number of mines required to change the traffic of vessels in specific 
categories.
However, planners’ capacity to map with this ability in mind requires conduct-
ing research and considering trends amid circumstances that may be in flux. For 
example, assume that the objective is to stop a particular shipping company from 
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This graphic showcases how traffic density can decrease on the basis of levels of mine threat. This reduction of traffic improves the 
engagement environment, reducing the probability of unintended tracking and collateral damage.
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is not highly motivated to risk damage—entering a minefield would cancel its 
insurance policy� This consideration disrupts the delivery timetable� However, 
some companies or state-sponsored ships might be willing to challenge the field, 
owing to a monetary or other kind of inducement promised for undertaking the 
challenge� The research should attempt to determine how much risk or attrition 
would be sufficient to convince all comers that the risk is not worth the reward� 
While one minefield may turn away ships in one group, an increased threat or 
level of attrition might be required to turn away those in another group� Further-
more, knowing how traffic should react provides planners with a starting point 
for selecting mine counter-countermeasures and provides some indication of the 
probability that the vessels within the minefield are targets of interest� Reducing 
the density of nontargets within an area lowers the likelihood that unintended 
targets will be tracked or hit, and provides warfighters with a clearer picture of 
the battle space� The concept even might be applied in the form of announcing 
a fictitious or phony minefield in an effort to reduce traffic so as to provide sub-
marines a clearer area of operation� This concept also can be applied to the goal 
of diverting traffic� Scalable traffic could fit under the operational objectives of 
disrupt and turn�
Current mining paradigms and shape concepts must be improved to prepare for 
the mining of the future� Doing so will require creating categories of operational 
objectives to assist commanders and planners in clarifying intent� The ability to 
plan for various effects on a target (e�g�, mobility kill, particularly when nonlethal 
mines are operational) will allow planners to recommend options that could 
achieve the intent while possibly reducing the number of mines required to com-
plete a mission� Such a reduction in mines likely would reduce costs, in terms 
of both risk and inventory� Linking operational objectives to MOEs will provide 
warfighters with a clear understanding of what type of effort must be carried out 
to realize the commander’s intent� Investing in new minefield planning capabili-
ties and MOEs will enable the fleet to capitalize now on emerging capabilities 
even as they prepare for mid- and long-term capabilities� It is critical that the 
concepts, language, support, and tools for the mines of tomorrow keep pace with 
the development of those mines�
Table 3 shows what tomorrow’s MOE pairings may look like�
Commanders and planners would be able to discuss varying levels of threat 
to the target and would have a clear starting point for discussing objectives and 
measures� Neal Kusumoto has written: “The real success of mining is often 
indirect and usually difficult to measure� The operational artist is faced with 
the choice of either building an MOE with his situation’s strategic and opera-
tional objectives clearly in mind, choosing one of the existing MOEs knowing its 
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limitations, or assuming a certain level of effect�”28 While the MOEs suggested in 
this article certainly do not encompass all those needed, a conversation should 
begin now regarding investment of the time necessary to update doctrine� This 
may relieve the pressure on some future planner attempting to match intent with 
MOEs during a conflict, allowing him or her to focus on the actual plan instead�
N O T E S
Operational Objective
Applicable MOEs
(estimated time of operational effect, time, and sustained threat  
are implied considerations throughout)
Disrupt Initial threat, continuous threat, threat over time, scalable traffic
Fix Initial threat
Low levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution, 
penetrator distribution, continuous threat, threat over time
Turn High levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution, 
penetrator distribution, continuous threat, scalable traffic
Block Highest levels of expected casualties, cumulative casualty distribution, 
penetrator distribution, continuous threat
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